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five effect of the project as a whole. The Corps' behavior was contrary
to the underlying policy and intent of NEPA.
The Corps argued that Phase I of the project, the research facility,
had independent utility from the rest of the project, and was thus a
separate project. The court agreed with Florida Wildlife's argument
that the Corps determination was arbitrary and capricious. It determined that the Corps' finding of "independent utility" was a rationalization employed to secure the permit as soon as possible. The court
held that this behavior by the Corps undermined the purposes of
NEPA.
The court also agreed with Florida Wildlife on the third issue regarding the Corps' insufficient consideration of the impacts of the project under NEPA. Even if the Corps did not unlawfully segment the
project and its finding of independent utility was supported, the law
still requires the Corps to address the "direct, indirect and cumulative
impacts on all Federal interests within the purview of the NEPA statute." The court found that the Corps did not sufficiently address these
impacts because it limited the project analysis to the impacts of the
research facility without considering the impacts of the future and
foreseeable development that would most likely occur if the plan for
the facility was approved.
In light of its findings, the court ruled for Florida Wildlife, and
granted their motion for summary judgment. The court then ordered
both parties to submit memoranda addressing the issue of remedies.
Charles Sweet
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 399 F.Supp. 2d 1335
(Fla.Dist. Ct. 2005) (granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin any
further authorizations under a general development permit that allowed certain wetland dredging and filling for the purposes of "suburban development" without meeting particular statutory requirements
of the Clean Water Act).
In the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the Sierra
Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council ("Sierra Club") submitted motions in June 2004 to enjoin a regional general development
permit issued in Northwest Florida by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). The regional permit in question ("SAJ-86") allowed for 48,150 acres of development including thousands of homes
and other residential, commercial, recreational, and institutional projects. Much of the anticipated construction required the discharge of
dredged materials into the wetlands. Sierra Club's complaint alleged
that the Corps issued SAJ-86 in violation of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the National Environmental Policy Act. In assessing the
need for a preliminary injunction, the district court found that the
Sierra Club established that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood of Si-
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erra Club's success on the merits; (2) authorizations under the permit
would result in irreparable harm; (3) the balance of harms weighed in
favor of the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to
the public interest.
CWA provisions authorize a general permit where the "activities
[covered by the general permit] are similar in nature, will cause only
minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately,
and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment." First, the Corps argued that SAJ-86 covered "similar in nature"
activities in that they were all components of "suburban development."
However, even applying Chevron deference, the district court found
that the plain language meaning could not support such a broad definition of "similar in nature" that would encompass "activities ranging
from horse stables to public works buildings, from light industrial facilities to multiple unit residential developments."
Second, the Corps argued that SAJ-86 did not violate the CWA's
provision regarding "minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment." The Corps pointed to several of the general permit's specific requirements, namely a 20% limit on the amount of wetlands that
may be destroyed in the permit area, and the complex mitigation
scheme involving a post-permit pre-authorization stage. However, the
district court noted that the Corps did not establish that the environmental effects would be both separately and cumulatively minimal.
The district court relied on Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Bulen
in holding that the CWA prohibits the Corps from conducting postpermit reviews of whether the development meets the minimum effects
requirements or if it requires mitigation. Therefore, the Corps needed
to have determined minimal environmental impact before rather than
after the issuance of the general permit. Further, because the CWA
requires assessment of all cumulative impacts of the development, SAJ86's 20% limit on wetland destruction did not sufficiently address the
issue.
Next, the district court turned to the question of irreparable harm,
the balancing of harms and the public interest. Sierra Club based its
request for preliminary injunction on its concerns surrounding the
authorization of the WaterSound North development that would ultimately eliminate seventy acres of wetlands and have severe negative
impacts on nearby Lake Powell. The Corps protested that the permit
already included conservation and compensatory mitigation plans to
protect the wetlands as well as stringent stormwater management systems and buffer zones to protect Lake Powell. However, the district
court also took note of the Sierra Club's two experts who opined that
the stormwater management system was scientifically flawed and that
the setbacks were inadequate. Although the district court did not
adopt one set of expert opinions over the other, it did find that the
Sierra Club sufficiently demonstrated that irreparable harm would re-
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suit absent the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The dredging and
filling of the wetlands alongside the threatened contamination of Lake
Powell cannot be undone or compensated through money damages.
Finally, the district court briefly addressed the remaining elements
of acquiring a preliminary injunction and concluded that the balance
of possible harms and public interest considerations weighed in the
Sierra Club's favor. The Corps did not enumerate any specific harm
that it would suffer because of the injunction, and although third parties may suffer losses in terms of missed development opportunities,
there was a strong public interest in ensuring that the Corps act within
its statutory boundaries. Further, the district court made special note
of the fact that nothing in its order precluded a party from seeking an
individual permit within the area specified by SAJ-86.
Therefore, the district court granted the Sierra Club's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, enjoined the Corps from issuing any new authorizations under SAJ-86, and enjoined any further development on
the WaterSound North project until further order of the court or until
the developers were able to obtain an individual permit.
Michelle Young

City of Guymon v. Cal Farley's Boys Ranch Found., CIV 04-457-BA,
2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 38506 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2005) (holding that
a city's proposed taking of a privately-owned water supply did not violate the federal or state constitutions' public purpose requirements
when the city engineer's report documented an increase in population
and a corresponding decrease in the city's available water supply).
The City of Guymon, Okalahoma ("City") passed a resolution seeking to exercise eminent domain over surface and water rights owned by
Cal Farley's Boys Ranch Foundation ("Ranch"). A number of specific
Oklahoma statutes authorize a municipality to exercise its eminent
domain power for expansion of its water supply. However, both the
United States Constitution and Oklahoma's state constitution require
that the proposed taking involve a public use or purpose. The Ranch
filed three exceptions to the City's proposed taking and moved for
summary judgment on the third exception in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which claimed the taking
did not serve a public purpose. The district court found the City's action did not violate either the federal or the state constitutions.
First, the court analyzed the City's action under the state constitution. For purposes of the state constitution, the City had the burden of
proof to establish that the taking served a public purpose. The district
court accepted the City Engineer's report indicating that the City's
increase in population and decrease in available water supply constituted a primafacie showing that the taking served a public purpose. In
addition, the court found the Ranch had not shown the City acted in

